I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally understood that as a country develops, it devotes greater resources to safety, including implementing precautionary measures designed to reduce the impacts of natural disasters. The recent onslaught of hurricanes/typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis, along with the accompanying devastating human and economic impacts, has spurred interest in the factors that determine the patterns and types of resulting losses. Previous research (Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2005; Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008) demonstrates that there is a distinguishable and predictable pattern between losses from natural disaster events and economic development. Generally, these studies show that as a country develops, vulnerability is reduced. Paralleling the efforts to spur development around the world has been a growing interest among policy makers and economists in fiscal decentralization. 1 While the existing research on the impacts of decentralization are generally positive in terms of public service delivery, as pointed out by Bardham (2002) , existing studies are "largely descriptive, not analytical, and often suggest correlations rather than causal processes." Because both national and subnational governments play such vital roles in the preparation for and response to disaster events, natural disasters may provide an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of governmental structure in protecting human life. In particular, we seek to understand whether decentralized governmental systems offer greater safety/protection from disaster events.
In this study we merge fiscal, economic, demographic, and geographic data with information on total deaths caused by natural disasters for many countries (53 to 78, depending on data availability) for years 1970 through 2005. Extensive information on disasters that has been underutilized by economists is available from the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance/Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (OFDA/CRED). 2 We use these data to estimate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the natural disasterinduced fatalities, while controlling for a range of other factors found to be important determinants of disaster-induced fatalities.
To preview the main finding, our analysis shows that while controlling for a variety of factors, nations with governments that are more decentralized experience fewer disasterrelated deaths. We also show that decentralization is most effective at protecting life when accompanied by higher levels of educational attainment. Generally, our findings suggest that decentralized governments are more effective in disaster preparations and/or responses relative to more centralized governmental systems.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
We review two relevant strands of literature: the research on fiscal decentralization and the economics of natural disasters. In these contexts, we further limit our review to those empirical studies that examine the performance of fiscal decentralization and research on the role of economic development in mitigating disaster-related fatalities.
Fiscal Decentralization
Of the substantial literature on fiscal decentralization, there is a strand that focuses on assessing the effectiveness of decentralization efforts in transition and developing economies. As discussed by Bardham (2002) , even though decentralization efforts are occurring in a number of countries around the world, quantitative evidence of effectiveness is limited. Studies that do exist utilize several methods, but the general approach is to evaluate government service delivery in a "before-after" framework. For example, Santos (1998) evaluated the decentralization initiative in Bolivia, finding that access to basic sanitation services (water and sewage) and utilization of elementary and secondary schools increased twofold following decentralization. Other studies such those by Alderman (1998) and Azfar, Kähkönen, and Meagher (2000) utilized household survey data to evaluate decentralization efforts in Albania and the Philippines, respectively. Both report evidence of improvements in public service delivery. The 1994 World Development Report on Infrastructure (World Bank 1994) cited cases of cost savings as well as quality improvement in public infrastructure projects following the transfer of management responsibility to local authorities.
The study, which included information from 42 countries, cited numerous cases in which decentralized governments were more effective in providing infrastructure such as roads and water supply at a lower cost.
These studies suggest that decentralized governmental systems provide public services more efficiently and at a lower cost than more centralized systems. However, Bardham (2002) asserts that many of the studies are unable to identify causal processes, because they typically evaluate the experience of a single country in a beforeafter framework. While these studies are very useful, they typically focus on the experience of a single country and are therefore not generalizable. Further, with the exception of Escaleras and Register (2012), whose work we discuss in detail later, we found no studies that utilized cross-country data to evaluate the effectiveness of government decentralization. The lack of cross-country analysis is largely due the unavailability of comparable data on costs and effectiveness of government activity.
In the context of the even more specific literature on disaster management and response, Wildasin (2008) points out that the particular institutional structures within fiscal federalism may create incentives for local governments to limit financial and policy preparations. 3 In the United States, for example, much of the incidence of local disaster recovery costs is shifted to the rest of society through intergovernmental transfers from national to the subnational levels. While such a policy relieves the financial stress in the affected region, it also reduces the incentive for subnational governments to invest in costly but effective disaster avoidance activities. Wildasin argues that it may be necessary for central government to implement new forms of federal control of subnational governments, including requirements for the creation of "rainy day" funds targeted at disaster management/recovery. Effective public-sector ex ante avoidance measures as well as ex post disaster response 3 Articles by Berke and Campanella (2006) , Birkland and Waterman (2008) , and Burby (2006) also highlight this issue of perverse incentives inherent in fiscal federalism in the context of natural disaster policies. requires coordination and sharing of financial costs between national and subnational governments. Subnational governments are perceived to have a comparative advantage over national governments in the management of land use, economic development, safety, and other regionally based policies that affect disaster risk. On the other hand, there is a role for national governments in setting certain disaster-management policies. This discussion suggests that there may be an optimal mix of responsibility between national and subnational governments in disaster management activity, and more generally in the devolution of public responsibilities. To summarize, this body of research identifies two potentially conflicting influences of decentralization. One strand of research suggests that decentralization may increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government. Other research warns of the potential perverse incentives that can be created as a result of the institutional arrangements embedded within fiscal federalism. We now turn to a discussion of the research on natural disaster impacts.
Economics of Natural Disasters
A critical underlying factor in any economy's response to disaster events is its level of wealth. Horwich (2000) argues that increased income translates to a general increase in the level of safety. Wildavsky (1988) interprets the degree of safety enjoyed by citizens of a country as a natural product of a growing market economy. Wildavsky broadly defines safety as protection against hazardous things and circumstances (e.g., less dangerous machinery, improved construction quality, more reliable automobile braking and steering mechanisms, and more reliable means of transportation and communication). He describes a learning process by which individual buyers weigh the cost of each technically feasible increment of safety against the expected benefit. In this framework, since demand for safety rises with income, a nation's per capita income is a good initial indication of its degree of safety. An increase in income not only leads to improvements in general safety, but also additional protection against natural disasters. 4 As a society becomes more developed, it sequentially implements policies designed to reduce the risk of the most hazardous factors in the environment.
While both developed and developing countries have some degree of disaster protection initiated by the public sector, the degree to which economic agents benefit from and are able to comply with and employ their own established safety standards depends on the level of economic development. For example, whether or not new construction complies with code depends on the costs of compliance relative to income. 5 In addition, at some threshold level of income, private disaster protection emerges (Horwich 2000 ) (e.g., emergency and risk management departments in commercial and other enterprises, private disaster consultants, disaster property insurances, including self-insurance through private saving [Skidmore 2001]) . Tol and Leek (1999) and Burton, Kates, and White (1993) also discuss the potential for reduced vulnerability as income increases. Burton, Kates, and White (1993) show a modest inverse relationship between deaths due to natural disasters and income for 20 countries for years 1973 and 1986 . As noted by Tol and Leek (1999) , there is probably a rapid transition between relatively vulnerable and invulnerable that occurs somewhere in the modernization process. As an illustration, the United States seems to have made such a transition during the twentieth century. The annual average number of deaths caused by hurricanes on the Atlantic coast during the 1900-1940 period was 327. However, over the 1972-2005 period there was an average of only about 58 deaths annually, including the 1,319 deaths caused by Hurricane Katrina. According to Albala-Bertrand (1993) , the people most affected by direct disaster events are primarily those who have weaker economic and political bases. While disasters occur in both industrialized and developing countries, about 4 In the context of natural disasters, Kahn (2005) and Toya and Skidmore (2007) show that fatalities are reduced as income rises.
5 While income is an important determinant of public safety, code compliance, and the like, more effective governmental arrangements can potentially make a difference. This purpose of this analysis is to shed light on this question. 95% of the deaths occur in the developing world (Alexander 1993) . This work illustrates that income and wealth are highly correlated with the number of deaths caused by natural disasters.
In a recent study that utilizes disaster data from OFDA/CRED, Kahn (2005) shows that income and institutional quality are important determinants of human casualties from natural disasters. Of special note, Kahn (2005) shows that while the probability of disaster occurrence is not related to the level of development, the number of deaths, injured, and homeless are reduced as income rises. His work also provides evidence that more democratic countries experience fewer human losses than do less democratic countries. Using data similar to that of Kahn (2005) , Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (2005) examine the relationship between earthquake fatalities and income inequality, finding that countries with greater inequality experience greater losses. Toya and Skidmore (2007) extend the research on the development-disaster relationship by examining additional factors such as human capital and the degree of trade openness, finding that both greater human capital and openness reduce losses from natural disaster events. Toya and Skidmore (2007) suggest that distinct from the private disaster-income-safety relationship is the existence of an underlying social/economic fabric that increases safety for all of society. Even more recently, Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) demonstrate that there may be important nonlinearities between the level of development and disaster impacts.
As highlighted by Horwich (2000) , disaster mitigation efforts (ex ante and ex post) are sometimes most effectively implemented by the private sector. For example, Horwich (2000) found that the most responsive organization following the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, was the Japanese mafia. This market-oriented group was especially effective at distributing resources when and where they were most needed. In contrast, government officials suffered from paralysis immediately following the quake, taking days to mobilize and provide meaningful assistance. Free market economists sometimes use the term "decentralization" as a synonym for privatization (Bardham 2002), arguing for the benefits of reducing the power of a strong centralized government. 6 In recent years, governments have been criticized for lack of preparation and inability in response to extreme large magnitude disaster events. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina both state and local officials in Louisiana were criticized for not enhancing the flood control infrastructure, which ultimately led to massive flooding. 7 Public responsibilities regarding safety, land use, and economic development decisions play important roles in limiting the impacts of natural catastrophes. For example, the first level of assistance in response to a disaster event will come from police and fire authorities. Such services account for a significant portion of public service expenditures regardless of fiscal structure. Within a decentralized governmental system, public safety services are typically provided by more autonomous subnational authorities. While ex post response (public safety) is crucial in terms of protecting human life, ex ante public sector preparations (establishing and enforcing land use and building code regulations, maintaining infrastructure, emergency planning) are also critical, and again these services are typically provided by local authorities in a decentralized government system. It would then seem that data on deaths from natural disaster events provides a good test case for examining the role of government structure on public service delivery as it relates to protecting the populace from the potentially devastating impacts of catastrophic events.
The most relevant study to date is that of Escaleras and Register (2012) , who conduct a similar analysis to determine the role of decentralization in protecting citizens from natural disaster events. Aggregating disaster data to the country level, they find a significant negative relationship between the degree of decentralization and disaster-related deaths. In addition to examining the veracity of their findings by using the disaster event as the unit of analysis (as opposed to country-level data used by Escalares and Register [2012] ), we extend this research in three ways. First, we examine robustness of the disaster impact-decentralization relationship using a broader set of control variables. Our examination includes all the key variables used by Escalares and Register (2012), as well as a number of other important variables: human capital, degree of trade openness, degree of vertical imbalance between national and subnational governments, civil liberty, fertility, and a measure of income inequality. Second, as discussed in detail later, we uncover interrelationships between decentralization and human capital. Third, we identify significant nonlinearities in the relationship between decentralization and disaster-induced fatalities. We now turn our attention to the empirical analysis.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data on natural disasters come from the OFDA/CRED International Database (2006) . The OFDA/CRED database is a result of collaboration between the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Efforts to establish better preparedness for and the prevention of disasters have been a primary concern for donor agencies, implementing agencies, and affected countries. For this reason, demand for complete and verified data on disasters and their human impact, by country and type of disasters, has been growing. The OFDA/CRED initiative to develop a validated database on disaster impacts is a response to this need.
We merge disaster data with macroeconomic and government fiscal data, which are available from several sources (Barro and Lee 1996; International Financial Statistics 8 ; Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002; World Bank 12 However, many disaster events resulted in zero fatalities. Our data are therefore truncated at zero. As discussed below, the censored nature of our data requires us to consider appropriate econometric methods. In our sample, the most common types of disasters were floods and extreme wind, accounting for 40% and 39% of the total number of disaster events, respectively. Eight percent of the total resulted from slides, and 11% from earthquakes; volcanic eruptions accounted for less than 3% of the total. It is also important to provide a careful definition of our key independent variable, the subnational share of total government expenditures. Caution is warranted because these data provide only a proxy for expenditure autonomy, as a large portion of subnational expenditures may be mandated by the central 12 The average is pulled up by the catastrophic tsunami that occurred in Asia in 2004. Omitting this event reduces the average number of deaths to 95. government. Despite this limitation, this variable is probably the best and most utilized measure of decentralization available. It includes the following expenditure categories: general public services; defense; public order and safety; education; health; social security and welfare; housing and community amenities; recreational, cultural, and religious affairs and services; fuel and energy; agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining and mineral resources, manufacturing, and construction; transportation and communication; other economic affairs and services; and other expenditures. Expenditures related to disaster preparation and management as well as response occur in a number of functional categories. Clearly, the public order and safety category is critical, but other functional areas like health, transportation and communication, and economic affairs are likely to also play important roles. We also include a measure of vertical imbalance, which is the ratio of intergovernmental transfers from national government to subnational government expenditures. Our analysis estimates the role of government structure in mitigating disaster fatalities in terms of spending at the subnational level, while controlling for the degree of subnational reliance on national authorities for financial resources. In some specifications, we also interact decentralization with educational attainment to determine how human capital alters government productivity in providing safety.
In order to rigorously evaluate the impact of decentralization on mitigating disaster losses, we control for other factors found to be important in previous studies (Kahn 2005; Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Kellenberg and Mobarak 2007; Escaleras and Register 2012) , such as income, income inequality, human capital, trade openness, and size of government. We examine these issues by including per capita GDP, a Gini coefficient of income inequality, average years of total schooling completed, openness ((exports + imports)/GDP), and government size (government expenditure/GDP). We also control for factors such as continent and year indicator variables, population, population density, fertility, average elevation of the country, percent of population that is urban and coastal, degree of ethnic fractionalization, political rights and civil liberty, and disaster type that may determine human fatalities induced by catastrophic events to examine the robustness of the role in decentralization in preventing fatalities. In some regressions we also control for disaster magnitude.
Based on the previous literature as well as the theoretical discussion, we expect higher levels of GDP per capita, educational attainment, and trade openness to reduce death tolls, and higher levels of population, population density, percent of the population that is urban and coastal to increase death tolls. Also, greater fertility and inequality are expected to increase disaster-induced fatalities. Detailed discussions of the expected relationships between fatalities and the other control variables (government size, elevation, political rights, civil liberty, and ethnic fractionalization) are provided by Kahn (2005) , Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (2005) , Toya and Skidmore (2007) , and Escaleras and Register (2012) . Given that our primary goal is to examine robustness of the coefficient on decentralization to the inclusion of variables used in previous studies, we do not provide a detailed discussion of the expected effects of these variables here. However, we offer in Table 2 a summary of the expected effects and the estimated impacts from previous studies.
We estimate a series of regressions using detailed disaster event data over the 1970-2005 period to determine the relationship between disaster-induced fatalities and decentralization. Use of panel data enables us to incorporate more than 2,500 disaster events from 53 to 78 countries (depending on data availability) for 1970-2005 into the analysis. As discussed above, we consider a number of control variables and use panel data econometric techniques. Our basic regression is characterized by the following equation:
where deaths jit is the total number of deaths 13 caused by natural disaster type j (hurricane, earthquake, flood, and so on) in country i during year t, decent jit is defined as subnational own source expenditures/total government expenditures, vi it is the ratio of national intergovernmental transfers to subnational expenditures, y kit represents a vector of k variables that may determine the deaths caused by the natural disaster (e.g., population, population density, elevation, coastal population, natural logarithm of per capita GDP in real U.S. dollars, a measure of human capital [total years of schooling], openness [(exports + imports)/ GDP], continent indicator variables, a series of indicator variables characterizing the type of disaster), α is a random effect for country i, and t represents a series of year indicator variables. In addition to controlling for various aspects of development, it is critical to control for the size of government to isolate the impact of government structure. We therefore include the ratio of government spending to GDP as a control variable. In some regressions we also control for additional factors considered by other researchers, such as measures of government quality (political rights and civil liberty), income inequality, fertility, urban population, ethnic fractionalization. Roughly one-third of the observed disaster events record zero deaths; our dependent variable is truncated at zero. We therefore use a Tobit random effects specification to properly treat the censored variable within the panel data framework. 14 Three other potentially important econometric issues warrant our attention: First, it is possible that the likelihood of a disaster event being recorded depends, in part, on the level of development. However, in a careful analysis, Kahn (2005) demonstrates that the probability of a disaster event occurring and being recorded is not dependent on the level of development: with the exception of floods, highand low-income countries are equally likely to experience a naturally occurring disaster event. Relying on Kahn's result, we move di- 14 The Tobit model within the fixed-effects framework could potentially be used, but the unconditional fixed-effects econometric approach generates biased parameter estimates. Conditional fixed effects could potentially be generated using a semiparametric technique developed by Honoré (1992) ; however, currently no procedure exists such that the fixed effects can be conditioned out of the likelihood.
rectly to an analysis of the determinants of disaster-related fatalities, though we conduct some analysis without the flood data to be sure that the core findings are robust to this consideration. Second, it is conceivable that countries with a greater prevalence of disaster-related deaths might allocate more government funding to the subnational level. If this is the case, then the relationship we observe between deaths and the ratio of subnational to total government spending would be biased by endogeneity. Further, given the broad range of issues that affect governance and government service provision decisions, it seems that the prevalence of disasters would not be among the most important factors in decentralization decisions. Though it seems unlikely that disaster impacts would influence the degree of decentralization, we also consider endogeneity in our robustness evaluation. Table 3 presents a series of regressions using data for all natural disasters recorded for all countries in our data set over the 1970-2005 period. In Column 1, we present a base regression in which only our measure of decentralization plus a set of core control vari- ables are included in the analysis. In Columns 2 and 3, we include other variables that have been considered in other research (Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2005; Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Escaleras and Register 2012) . Column 2 presents a regression that includes all variables found in the Column 1 regression plus per capita GDP, schooling years, degree of trade openness, size of government, and fertility. In the Column 3 regression we add a measure of income inequality, measures of government quality (political rights and civil liberty), urban population, and ethnic fractionalization as additional explanatory variables. A key purpose in presenting these three regressions is to examine the robustness of the relationship between decentralization and disaster-induced fatalities.
IV. RESULTS
Results presented in Columns 4-6 repeat those in Columns 1-3, except the evaluation of decentralization is modified such that we can evaluate potential nonlinearities in the death-decentralization relationship. Here the idea is that a country with a low level of decentralization is likely to benefit by increasing decentralization more so than a country that is already highly decentralized. To examine this notion, we create four variables that indicate whether a country has a low level of decentralization, as measured by the ratio of subnational expenditure to total government expenditures (bottom quarter), a low-middle level of decentralization (second quarter), an upper-middle level of decentralization (third quarter), and a high level of decentralization (top quarter). We then interact these indicator variables with the decentralization measure. 15 These interaction terms help to identify a potential nonlinear relationship between deaths induced by disasters and the degree of decentralization by allowing the coefficient on decentralization to vary across the range of observed levels of decentralization.
Column 1 results show a negative and statistically significant relationship between decentralization and death tolls. In Columns 2 and 3, the coefficients on decentralization maintain statistical significance when we include a wide range of variables considered by other researchers. When we consider nonlinearities, as in Columns 4-6, the role of decentralization is striking. First, the coefficient on decentralization is much larger and its statistical significance increases. Second, the interaction terms show that countries with low levels of decentralization experience dramatic reductions in fatalities by becoming more decentralized. However, the benefits of increased decentralization, though still present, drop off for countries that are moderately or highly decentralized. Our estimates suggest that a highly centralized country that moves toward decentralization experiences a reduction in fatalities that is about four times as great as a country with a high level of decentralization. We will return to a discussion of the magnitudes of these effects later.
Consider also the coefficients on the control variables. In Columns 1 and 4 we see that that population and elevation are statistically significant control variables: As we expected, countries with greater populations have more fatalities. Consistent with the results of Escaleras and Register (2012), countries with higher elevations tend to experience more fatalities. For disasters such as floods and landslides, elevation is likely to be negatively related to death rates, but this may be reversed for disasters such as volcanoes and earthquakes. This result suggests that the latter outweighs the former. However, population density and coastal population were not significant determinants of fatalities. Turning to Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, we see that per capita GDP, total years of schooling, and the degree of trade openness are also important determinants of disaster fatalities. That is, higher income, higher levels of education, and a greater degree of openness reduce fatalities. Openness is thought to enhance commodity distribution networks so that international assistance can be allocated to areas in need more effectively. In addition, countries with greater openness may have access to technologies and practices that improve safety. Also, greater urban populations are correlated with more fatalities, a result that is consistent with that of Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) . Government size, the degree of vertical imbalance, income inequality, fertility, political rights, and civil liberty are generally not significant in the regressions. Generally, these findings are consistent with those of Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (2005) , Kahn (2005) , Toya and Skidmore (2007) , and Escaleras and Register (2012) . We note that the negative relationship between decentralization and disaster-induced deaths is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of variables. However, in our examinations we identified an interaction between decentralization and educational attainment that is important in terms of reducing fatalities, and we discuss this next.
In Table 4 , we present a set of regressions to explore the decentralization-educational attainment relationship. For comparison, these regressions include the same set of control variables as the regression in Column 2 of Ta- ble 3, as we consider Column 2 our base regression. 16 In Column 1 we present a regression that excludes the two measures of government structure (decentralization and vertical imbalance) to demonstrate that the coefficient on total educational attainment is larger when measures of decentralization are excluded (the coefficient increases from 0.108 to 0.286). In Column 2 we present a regression that includes total education and an interaction between decentralization and educational attainment. In this regression the coefficient on total education is insignificant, but the interaction term is negative and highly significant, indicating that countries that are 16 None of the core conclusions are changed if we use results from the other columns in Table 3. both decentralized and have higher levels of education experience fewer deaths when disasters strike. In Column 3, we examine the decentralization-education connection further by including the decentralization measure and the decentralization-education interaction term. The coefficient on decentralization is now insignificant, but the coefficient on the interaction variable is again negative and highly significant. In Column 4, we include decentralization, total education, and the interaction term together in a single regression. Here, none of the coefficients on these variables is statistically significant; educational attainment, decentralization, and the interaction term are highly correlated (the correlation coefficients between education and the interaction term and decentralization and the interaction term are 0.803 and 0.809, respec-tively), and thus multicolinearity is present. 17 This results in less precise coefficient estimates. To address multicolinearity, we present an alternative regression in Column 5 that includes decentralization, total educational attainment, and interaction between higher education and decentralization. In this regression, we see that the coefficients on decentralization and total education are still statically insignificant, whereas the interaction term is now highly significant and negative. These findings suggest that decentralization and educational attainment are complementary when it comes to the protection of human life. Decentralization in the absence of education is insufficient, as is educational attainment in the absence of decentralized government systems. One interpretation of these finding is that the productivity of an educated population in terms of protecting life is enhanced by greater autonomy at the local level. An alternative interpretation is that the ability of local government to operate effectively and thus produce a safer environment is enhanced by having an educated work force from which to hire capable public employees. In either case, it appears that the combination of education and decentralization serves to reduce fatalities.
To examine the robustness of these findings, we conduct additional analysis, some of which is found in Table 5 . In Columns 1-3, we repeat the regression present in Column 2 of Table 1 , except we include measures of disaster magnitude. In about a third of the disaster entries in the OFDA/CRED database include information on disaster magnitudes in the cases of earthquakes (Richter scale), floods (area flooded), and high winds (wind speed). In order to avoid the omission of about two-thirds of our observations, we calculated the average level of disaster magnitude for each type of disaster. We then used the average level for those disasters for cases in which no magnitude was recorded. While not a perfect solution, this approach enables us to incorporate some new information on disaster magnitude into the regression analysis. As can 17 The direct correlation between education and decentralization is 0.365 and is therefore not a serious concern with regard to multicolinearity. Rather, it is when the interaction term is introduced that multicolinearity arises.
be seen in Columns 1-3, the coefficients on disaster magnitudes are positive and highly significant; as expected, larger magnitude events result in more fatalities. Of particular interest, the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients on the decentralization variable remain. 18 Researchers such as Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Escaleras and Register (2012) have noted that fiscal decentralization is potentially endogenously determined. Both sets of authors have successfully used variables that characterize a country's legal origin (English, Socialist, French, German, and Scandinavian) as effective instruments for decentralization. 19 Following this previous research, data on legal origin in a country are taken from La and are used as instruments for our measure of decentralization. In estimates that are not presented but are available upon request, we test for the validity of legal origin as instruments for disaster-induced deaths, showing that they are effective instruments. 20 We then estimate the relationship between decentralization and disaster-induced deaths using an instrumental variables Tobit procedure. These estimates are presented in Columns 4-6 of Table 5 . Again, these regressions are similar to those presented in our core analysis, though the coefficients are less precisely estimated. 21 18 If we reduce our sample to include only those observations for which we have information on disaster magnitude, the coefficient on decentralization is generally not statistically significant.
19 Legal scholars such as Glos (1978) have shown that civil codes evolving from French origins tend to be more centralized, whereas those evolving from the British tend to be more decentralized. 20 To examine the appropriateness of these instruments, we use the Sargon's test of overidentifying restrictions. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid, an indication that we have identified appropriate instruments for the decentralization variable. Given that we have appropriate instruments, we next conduct the Wald test of exogeneity, in which we fail to reject the null hypothesis that decentralization is exogenous. It therefore appears that two-stage least squares is unnecessary. 21 The coefficient on decentralization is generally larger as compared to analogous regressions that do not address endogeneity. However, as shown in Table 5 these coefficients are statistically significant in the Column 4 regression, marginally significant in Column 5, and insignificant in Column 6. Table  3 , this depends on the starting point in terms of the degree of decentralization. 22 Consider first a country that is very centralized. Suppose a very centralized country experienced increase in subnational government expenditures as a proportion of total government expenditures from 0.1 to 0.2 (lowest quartile in terms of decentralization): Based on the estimates from Column 6 of Table 3, a 0.1 increase in decentralization is estimated to reduce lives lost by about 43%. However, for a country that is already highly decentralized the effect is much smaller. For example, the effect for a country that has a subnational to total government expenditures of 0.4 (third quartile), the effect of an increase in decentralization of 0.1 leads to a reduction in fatalities of just 9%. 23 This analysis provides new evidence that policy shifts toward decentralization have improved safety and thus quality of life for citizens, but the effect is most pronounced in countries with highly centralized systems.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Private entities, governments, and not-forprofit organizations engage in a variety of actions to reduce the impacts of natural disasters. For example, in areas where seismic activity is present, building codes (and compliance) are likely to be more stringent. In hurricane-prone 22 Tobit coefficients require an adjustment to obtain marginal effects. In particular, we evaluate the marginal effect of decentralization at the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable (Wooldridge 2002) . 23 Our estimated average effect is roughly comparable to that of Escaleras and Register (2012) , though our findings suggest larger effects for very centralized countries.
areas, certain measures may be undertaken to protect life and property (forecasting, warning systems, planning, building codes, etc.). Public sector preparations and response to natural disasters are critical. Lack of proper preparation and delayed and/or ineffective response may result in lives lost. The primary objective of this study is to determine the degree to which government fiscal structure is important in disaster-induced fatality prevention.
Previous research that has sought to assess the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization is limited in terms of identifying causal relationships, and more systematic analysis has been hampered by the lack of consistent crosscountry data on government costs and effectiveness (Bardham 2002) . Despite the tragic nature of catastrophic events, they in fact provide a good opportunity to assess the role of government structure in limiting the fatalities resulting from such events: death tolls provide a clear and consistent time-varying crosscountry measure of effectiveness.
Our analysis provides evidence that more decentralized countries, as measured by the ratio of subnational expenditures to total government expenditures, experience fewer deaths. We also show that highly centralized countries benefit the most from decentralization. Further, our findings suggest that educational attainment and decentralization are complementary; decentralization is more effective when human capital is present and vice versa. This finding is also consistent with the theoretical work of Brueckner (2006) and the empirical analysis of Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vasquez, and McNab (2005) , who provide arguments and evidence for the notion that decentralized systems increase human capital.
This research provides systematic generalized evidence that decentralized government systems are more effective in providing safety in the context of disaster impacts. We speculate that these benefits are accrued through pre-and postdisaster management activities. As previously discussed, there are a host of "localized" public services that may play a role in reducing loss of life: building code and zoning enforcement, police and fire services, transportation, health services, disaster preparation and re-sponse, and critical infrastructure investment. Understanding which of these government services are most critical in terms of saving lives is an important topic of future research. Our findings also demonstrate that decentralization in the absence of sufficient levels of human capital may be ineffective. Thus, it may be prudent for countries in the process of decentralization to simultaneously make critical investments in education.
These results are robust to the inclusion (or exclusion) of a variety of other factors that have been found to be important determinants of disaster-related deaths in previous studies. Generally, the research presented here increases our understanding of the role of government in disaster management and response. Disaster death toll data has enabled us to conduct a time-varying cross-country evaluation of the effectiveness of decentralization efforts, and therefore this research offers a contribution to both the literatures on the fiscal decentralization and the economics of natural disasters. 
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